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THE JUDGE'S ART
WALLACE MENDELSON t
A judge on the bench is now and then in your whimsical situation between
Tragedy and Comedy; inclination drawing one way and a long line of prece-
dents the other.
-MANSFIELD
When men act on the principle of intelligence, they go out to find the facts
and to make their wisdom. When they ignore it, they go inside themselves
and find only what is there. They elaborate their prejudice, instead of
increasing their knowledge.
-WALTR LIPPMANN
Plato's ancient question will not down. Is it "more advantageous
to be subject to the best man or the best laws ?" 1 We have long since
settled on the Rule of Law, but that catch-phrase hardly meets the
problem. As Plato observed, laws by definition are general rules;
their generality is their essence and their weakness. For generality
contemplates averages-the stuff of books. It falters before the com-
plexities of life and must usually concern itself with form rather than
substance. Accordingly, in Plato's ideal view, laws are a rough make-
shift far inferior to the discretion of the philosopher king, whose pure
wisdom would render real justice by giving each man his due, not the
due of some nonexistent "average man." 2
Aristotle anticipated our choice by rejecting the allwise ruler:
"[T]o invest man with authority is to introduce a beast, as desire is
something bestial, and even the best of men in authority are liable
to be corrupted by anger." Law, in contrast, is "intelligence without
passion." Yet Aristotle knew with Plato that:
All law is universal but about some things it is not possible to
make a universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases
then in which it is necessary to speak universally but not possible
to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case, though it is not
ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less
correct; for the error is not in the law nor in the legislator but
in the nature of the thing, since the matter of practical affairs is
of this kind from the start.3
t Professor of Government, University of Texas. A.B. 1933, University of Wis-
consin; LL.B. 1936, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1940, University of Wisconsin.
I Aristotle posed the problem in Politics after Plato had explored it in Statesmen.
See 4 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 496-507 (Jowett ed. 1892).
2 This and the next paragraph have drawn heavily from McILvAI, THE GRow H
OF POLITIcAL THOUGHT IN THE WEST (1932).
3 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, book V, ch. 10, at 1137, in 9 THE Woaxs
OF ARISTOTLE (Ross ed. 1925).
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And so, having rejected the philosopher king in favor of the
Rule of Law, we call him back to limited service and name him judge.'
In this capacity he fills the gap between the generalities of law and the
specifics of life. Holmes put it in a thimble: "general propositions do
not decide concrete cases." I Thus judges must. We have synthesized
the wisdom of Plato and the wisdom of Aristotle. An inclination one
way rather than the other is the difference between our "activists" and
our "humilitarians"--only the names are new. How much informed
discretion, how much "law," is appropriate to the peculiarities of each
concrete case? What are the proper proportions for each of the
myriad contexts in which a court must resolve the discrepancy between
the generic directives given it and the unanticipated or imperfectly fore-
seen controversies that demand adjudication? As Lord Wright put
it, "notwithstanding all the apparatus of authority, the judge has
nearly always some degree of choice." 6
Such is the judge's burden. In its discharge he is plagued by all
the frailties, not just the "bestiality" of desire, passion, and anger
that Aristotle mentioned. He must clear his endless dockets and
somehow maintain the stability and predictability of the Rule of Law
without losing the flexibility implicit in the sound discretion of the
philosopher king. He must mediate between the letter and the spirit;
between the traditions of the past and the convenience of the present;
between society's need for stability and its need for change; between
liberty and authority; between the whole and its parts-all this in
contexts that no lawmaking assembly could be expected to foresee.
Plainly this entails high art. How may the job be done?
How, indeed, does one create a poem, or a symphony? If our
literature on such matters is as sparse as it is on the judge's art, it is
virtually nonexistent. Cardozo's famous effort-The Nature of the
Judicial Process-stands almost alone and somewhat dated. Was it
not, after all, a tract for the times directed to the last vestige of pretense
that judges are mere mimics-that creativity is not for them? Thanks
to Cardozo, supplemented by the innuendoes of "the great dissenters"
after World War I and the Court crisis of the mid-1930's, we are
more sophisticated now. Yet, while the legislative, executive, and
administrative processes have been examined endlessly, few have pro-
ceeded further-and only modestly-in the thicket where Cardozo
pioneered.7 What we have for the most part are scattered insights in
4 In another, more modern capacity, we call him "administrator."
5 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
( WRIGHT, LEAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES xxv (1939).
7 See Chafee, Do Judges Make Or Discover Law?, 91 PROCEEDINGS Am. PxIr.
Soc'y 405 (1947); Frankfurter, Some Observations ot the Natures of the Judicial
Process of Supreme Court Litigation, 98 PROCEEDINGS Am. PxIL. Soc'y 233 (1954).
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writings directed to other ends. Some of these are gathered below in
the hope that they may stimulate further thought on one of the pressing
problems of our day: the role of judges in democratic government.
Of course, some "laws" are so clear that they preclude litigation,
as, for example, the constitutional provision with respect to the number
of senators from each state. Others are so vague, so lacking in
standards, as to foreclose adjudication. Thus Holmes ventured to
think that:
every time . . . a judge declines to rule whether certain conduct
is negligent or not he avows his inability to state the law; and
that the meaning of leaving nice questions to the jury is that
while if a question of law is pretty clear we can decide it, as it
is our duty to do, if it is difficult it can be decided better by twelve
men at random from the street.'
Similarly, Judge Learned Hand observed that a jury verdict as to
whether the accused had violated an obscenity statute "is not the
conclusion of a syllogism of which they are to find only the minor
premiss, but really a small bit of legislation ad hoc, like the
standard of due care." ' Putting such issues to a jury is not unlike
leaving inscrutable constitutional standards for application (read in-
carnation) by the political branches of government.'0
Between these extremes where the law is neither so clear nor so
obscure as to preclude adjudication, judges must find or make criteria
for judgment. We have it on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's authority
that:
The decisions in the cases that really give trouble rest on judg-
ment, and judgment derives from the totality of a man's nature
and experience. Such judgment will be exercised by two types
of men, broadly speaking, but of course with varying emphasis-
those who express their private views or revelations, deeming
them, if not vox dei, at least vox populi; or those who feel strongly
that they have no authority to promulgate law by their merely
personal view and whose whole training and proved performance
substantially insure that their conclusions reflect understanding
of, and due regard for, law as the expression of the views and
feelings that may fairly be deemed representative of the community
as a continuing society."
It will be noted that here even a convinced humilitarian recognizes that
the problem is not whether judges shall make or find the law, but
whether internal or external data shall guide their creativity. Mr.
8 HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPRms 164, 233 (1920).
9 United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
10 See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) ; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849).
IFrankfurter, supra note 7, at 237.
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Justice Stone's less challenging language may be more generally ac-
ceptable:
[T]he great constitutional guarantees and immunities of personal
liberty and of property, which give rise to the most perplexing
questions of constitutional law and government, are but state-
ments of standards to be applied by courts according to the
circumstances and conditions which call for their application. The
chief and ultimate standard which they exact is reasonableness of
official action . . . They are not statements of specific com-
mands. They do not prescribe formulas as to which govern-
mental action must conform ....
Whether the constitutional standard of reasonableness of
official action is subjective, that of the judge who must decide, or
objective in terms of a considered judgment of what the com-
munity may regard as within the limits of the reasonable, are
questions which the cases have not specifically decided. Often
these standards do not differ. When they do not, it is a happy
augury for the development of law which is socially adequate.
But the judge whose decision may control government action, as
well as in deciding questions of private law, must ever be alert
to discover whether they do differ and, differing, whether his own
or the objective standard will represent the sober second thought
of the community, which is the firm base on which all law must
ultimately rest. 2
For humilitarians, of course, there can be no doubt-the judge's
personal views have no proper place in his official life. "It comes down
to this," Cardozo said:
There are certain forms of conduct which at any given place and
epoch are commonly accepted under the combined influence of
reason, practice and tradition, as moral or immoral. If we were
asked to define the precise quality that leads them to be so char-
acterized, we might find it troublesome to make answer, yet the
same difficulty is found in defining other abstract qualities, even
those the most familiar. The forms of conduct thus discrim-
inated are not the same at all times or in all places. Law accepts
as the pattern of its justice the morality of the community whose
conduct it assumes to regulate. In saying this, we are not to
blind ourselves to the truth that uncertainty is far from banished.
Morality is not merely different in different communities. Its
level is not the same for all the component groups within the
same community. A choice must still be made between one
group standard and another. We have still to face the problem,
at which one of these levels does the social pressure become strong
enough to convert the moral norm into a jural one? All that we
can say is that the line will be higher than the lowest level of
12 Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 23-25
(1936).
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moral principle and practice, and lower than the highest. The
law will not hold the crowd to the morality of saints and seers.
It will follow, or strive to follow, the principle and practice of
the men and women of the community whom the social mind
would rank as intelligent and virtuous.13
This, of course, is an elaboration of the old common-law "reasonable
man" standard which different judges may express in different terms.
Thus Lord Haldane observed:
I think that there are many things of which judges are bound to
take judicial notice which lie outside the law properly so called,
and among those things are what is called public policy and the
changes which take place in it. The law itself may become modi-
fied by this obligation of the judges. [Some law, like the Rule
Against Perpetuities, has become] . . . a crystalized proposition
forming part of the ordinary common law, so definite that it must
be applied without reference to whether a particular case involves
the real mischief to guard against which the rule was originally
introduced. [But between such rules and those] . . . in which
the principle of public policy has never crystalized into a definite
or exhaustive set of propositions, there lies an intermediate class.
Under this third category fall the instances in which public policy
has partially precipitated itself into recognized rules which belong
to law properly so called, but where these rules have remained
subject to the moulding influence of the real reasons of public
policy from which they proceeded. 4
Chief Judge Learned Hand put it with a different emphasis:
There is a hierarchy of power in which the judge stands low; he
has no right to divinations of public opinion which run counter
to its last formal expressions. Nevertheless, the judge has, by
custom, his own proper representative character as a comple-
mentary organ of the social will, and in so far as conservative
sentiment, in the excess of caution that he shall be obedient, frus-
trates his free power by interpretation to manifest the half-framed
purposes of his time, it misconceives the historical significance of
his position and will in the end render him incompetent to perform
the very duties upon which it lays so much emphasis. The pro-
fession of the law of which he is a part is charged with the
articulation and final incidence of the successive efforts toward
justice; it must feel the circulation of the communal blood or it
will wither and drop off, a useless member.' 5
Finally, in Professor Swisher's words:
The Supreme Court is able to lead in constitutional development,
then, only by virtue of the fact that its leadership is of such a
13 CARwozo, PAADxs OF LEGAL ScmNcE 36-37 (1928).
14Rodriguez v. Speyer Bros., 88 L.J.K.B. (as.) 147, 157-59 (1918) (Haldane,
L.J.)"
15 Hand, The Speech of Justice, 29 HA~v. L. REv. 617-18 (1916).
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character that the people and their representatives are willing to
follow. To put the matter more simply, the Supreme Court suc-
ceeds in leading largely to the extent of its skill not merely as a
leader but as a follower. Since the medium of its leadership is
the law, or the decision of cases in terms of law, we can go further
and say that the effectiveness of the Court's leadership is measured
by its ability to articulate deep convictions of need and deep pat-
terns of desire on the part of the people in such a way that the
people, who might not have been able themselves to be similarly
articulate, will recognize the judicial statement as essentially their
own. The Court must sense the synthesis of desire for both con-
tinuity and change and make the desired synthesis the expressed
pattern of each decision.'"
In short, troublesome legal issues shall be settled in harmony with
the sense of the community, whether in the judge's view the com-
munity be right or wrong. Accordingly, when doubtful matters cannot
be avoided, they may be referred to a jury, to the political processes, or
to the "reasonable man." But who is this creature? Like jury and
legislature, he symbolizes all of us. He is a standard, an American
Everyman, whereby a hard-pressed judge seeks to capture the "views
and feelings that may fairly be deemed representative of the community
as a continuing society" (Frankfurter) ; "the sober second thought" of
the body politic (Stone); the "forms . . . which are commonly ac-
cepted under the combined influence of reason, practice and tradition"
(Cardozo); "public policy" (Haldane); "half formed [community]
purposes" (Hand); or the basic "convictions of need and deep patterns
of desire on the part of the people" (Swisher). The underlying
thought, of course, is plain:
[T]he judge must always remember that he should go no further
than he is sure the government would have gone, had it been
faced with the case before him. If he is in doubt, he must stop,
for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests in the society for
which he speaks would have come to a just result, even though
he is sure that he knows what the just result should be. He is
not to substitute even his juster will for theirs; otherwise it
would not be the common will which prevails, and to that extent
the people would not govern."
The "reasonable man" approach is orthodox. A not entirely in-
compatible guide to decision-equally mundane, if less rational-is
the informed "hunch" which Judge Ulman describes in action:
16 SWISHER, THE SuPRE.m COURT ix MODERN ROLE 179-80 (1958).
17HAND, Is a Judge Free it Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPmT OF LmmTy
109 (1952).
1961]
530 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.109:524
On the morning of my third day of solitary work on this [rate]
case the familiar hunch came to me. Quite suddenly, while read-
ing an opinion of the Supreme Court, I discovered that I was
going to have to decide in favor of the railway company. This
discovery came to me with a shock; for not until then had I
realized fully the strength of my bias the other way ....
Therefore I determined to test to the utmost the validity of
my hunch. The way to do it was to write an opinion. If the
half-thoughts and partial conclusions which were forming in my
mind would go down on paper and stay there, then they were my
deliberate judgement. Otherwise I might erase what I should
first write and decide the case the way I wanted to decide it ....
There had developed within me a clear-cut issue between the
emotions and the intellect.'
But is the mundane never to be enlightened by frankly tran-
scendental values? Must we, insofar as courts are concerned, live
forever in a moral status quo? Is judicial law to be perpetually con-
fined by the morals of the masses?
When a case comes before a court for decision, it may be that
nothing can be drawn from the sources heretofore mentioned;
there may be no statute, no judicial precedent, no professional
opinion, no custom, bearing on the question involved, and yet
the court must decide the case somehow . . . . The French
Code Civil [art. 4] says: "Le juge qui refusera de juger sous
pr6texte du silence, de l'obscurit6 ou de l'insuffisance de la loi,
pourra tre poursuivi comme coupable de d~ni de justice." And
I do not know of any system of law where a judge is held to be
justified in refusing to pass upon a controversy because there is
no person or book or custom to tell him how to decide it. He
must find out for himself; he must determine what the Law ought
to be; he must have recourse to the principles of morality.'"
Or in the rather more sophisticated language of Lord MacMillan:
It is thus clear that the judiciary are constantly confronted with
the necessity of making a choice between the doctrines of the
law which they are to hold applicable to a particular case, and
the choice which they make in the particular instance results in-
evitably in the expansion or restriction of the doctrine applied or
rejected. It is at this point that what may, I think, quite properly
be called ethical considerations operate and ought to operate. I
hope I shall be acquitted of any suggestion that judges should
allow themselves to be swayed by sentiment to wrest the law,
1 8
ULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND 197-98 (1933). See also Hutcheson,
The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14
CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
19 GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 302 (2d ed. 1921).
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and I should deprecate as strongly as any the admission of the
motives of the social reformer into the counsels of the Bench. I
am no friend of that spurious kind of equity which Lord Bramwell
robustly denounces as consisting in "A disregard of general prin-
ciples and general rules in the endeavor to do justice more or less
fanciful in particular cases." Other eminent judges in equally
vigorous language, to which I am quite prepared to subscribe,
have condemned the impropriety of allowing other than purely
legal considerations to influence the decisions of the Courts. But
when, as happens from time to time, the law itself presents a
choice, and when it is a question whether one or other principle
is to be applied, then it seems to me that it is impossible, as it is
undesirable, that the decision should not have regard to the
ethical motive of promoting justice.20
Other judges may be inclined to go further as the following quotations
from Chief Justice Waite, Chief Justice Reid of the Supreme Court of
Georgia, and Judge Medina, respectively, suggest:
I have read with interest your brief . . . and am satisfied the
case is by no means as desperate as I thought it was. Justice
is on your side certainly and that is nine points in every law suit.
I never realized this so much as since I have been on the bench.21
[I]f he [the lawyer] arrives at a sound solution, in his intermin-
able quest for it, it will finally rest upon the eternal principles of
what is right and wrong, and, if he finds that some judicial prece-
dent is to the contrary, either he or those ministers of justice who
are to follow him will come back again to those principles that lie
eternally in what is right and wrong. Thus, pursuit of the law,
glamorous as it is, is very little different on the bench from what
it is in the practice."
I do not see why a judge should be ashamed to say that he prays
for divine guidance and for strength to do his duty. Indeed,
there came a time . . . when I did the most sincere and the
most fervent praying that I ever did in my life.
I suddenly found myself in the midst of that trial of the Com-
munists. It took me a long time to realize what they were trying
to do to me. But as I got weaker and weaker and found the
burden difficult to bear, I sought strength from the one source
that never fails . . . . my unguided will alone and such self-
control as I possess were unequal to this test.'
20 MacMillan, Law and Ethics, 49 SCOT. L. REv. 61, 69 (1933).
2 1 Letter From Chief justice Waite to H. Newbegin, June 16, 1877, quoted in
TRMBLE, CaIEF JUSTICE WAiTE 266 (1938).
22 Reid, What a Lawyer Discovers on Becoming a Judge, 1940 ALA. BAR Ass'N
PROCEEDINGS 316, 323-24.
23 Medina, The Judge and His God: "We Are Not the Masters," 38 A.B.A.J.
661, 662-63 (1952).
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The virtues and dangers of extrarational intrusions upon the
judicial process are suggested in the philosophies of Lon Fuller and
John Dickinson:
The solution for the problem of rationalism versus irrationalism
as it affects human conduct is, I think, to be found in a balance
in which man's rational nature and the unrationalized side of his
being reciprocally check and counterpoise one another. In such
a state of balance, intuitive insight tempers reason and preserves
it from excesses, while at the same time there is no relaxing of
the effort to force intuition and instinct into the patterns of
articulate thought. I believe it is not going too far to say that
it was such a state of balance which sustained Western civilization
during its progressive periods.1
4
Under the name "law of nature," this ideal law, derived from
currently active moral aspirations by philosophers, divines and
judges, has supplied not merely a pattern and model, but a power-
ful stimulus for changes in and additions to the law of a given
time and place. Of course, such ideal law can only influence the
actual insofar as portions of it are from time to time adopted
by judges and legislators. Naturally the ideal has varied, and
not merely from period to period, but from individual thinker
to individual thinker; yet in the large, the pursuit of it has usually
represented an effort to discover and give effect to fundamental
underlying human values, and the judge who has been influenced
by the concept in his decisions has for the most part been doing
what he could to build the law according to the better lights of
his own age ....
[The hostility of the "realists"] to rules arises precisely from
the element of stability which rules necessarily involve, and they,
therefore, seek to eliminate the rule-element in law in favor of a
conception of law as consisting essentially of intelligent discre-
tion . . . . This view, stripped of its contemporary phraseology
and modernistic trappings, is nothing but a return to the age-old
idea that the best government is government by philosopher-kings.
This idea long ago lost out in the competition of the market-place
to the more pedestrian idea of government by law, because law,
although at the expense of a certain amount of flexibility, can
at least institutionalize the common sense wisdom of mankind,
while the wisdom of the philosopher-king can often be proved to
be wisdom only by the persuasive force of bullets and bombs.
Whether the wisdom of modern philosopher-kings can be made
to rest on any different kind of proof remains to be seen.25
If doubt invites and often compels judicial "legislation," doubt
is not a self-defining quality. One trait of the activists-old
2 4 Fuller, My Philosophy of Law, in My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 113, 122 (1941).
25Dickinson, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 91, 101-02,
106 (1941).
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and new-is their relative freedom from uncertainty. They do not
question the judicial duty of deference to the community when the law
is foggy, but they have a marked ingenuity for scattering the clouds of
doubt. Often, where colleagues are troubled, the activist finds (or, as
it seems to some, legislates) certitude. His characteristic gambit is to
discover or revive the "true purpose" of the Fathers-for he dare not
openly repudiate the orthodox view that judgment should spring from
some objective, external standard. Thus, as Jerome Frank put it,
All judges exercise discretion, individualize abstract rules, make
law . . . . The fact is, and every lawyer knows it, that those
judges who are most lawless, or most swayed by the "perverting
influences of their emotional natures," or most dishonest, are often
the very judges who use most meticulously the language of com-
pelling mechanical logic, who elaborately wrap about themselves
the pretense of merely discovering and carrying out existing rules,
who sedulously avoid any indication that they individualize
cases.
2 6
Thomas Reed Powell expressed it differently: "I think that what I
most object to in many Justices is something that springs from a feel-
ing of judicial duty to try to make out that their conclusions come from
the Constitution." 27
Even Plato recognized that a philosopher king would be unac-
ceptable unless he could hide his naked power by a "noble fiction." It
follows, of course, that platonists on the bench do not avow, but only
practice, activism. When Mr. Justice Field needed a broad consti-
tutional tool to restrain state regulation of business he "discovered"
that the natural rights listed in the Declaration of Independence had
been embedded in the fourteenth amendment:
Among these inalienable rights, as proclaimed in that great docu-
ment [the Declaration], is the right of men to pursue their
happiness, by which is meant the right to pursue any lawful busi-
ness or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal
rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop
their faculties so as to give them their highest enjoyment.3
Modem activists find that Field was quite wrong; that the Fathers
intended to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights (rather than the Declara-
tion) into the fourteenth amendment.' The effective difference, of
2 6 
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 137-38 (1949).
2 7 POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 179
(1956).
28Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 754, 757 (1884) (con-
curring opinion).
.
29 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black; J., dissenting).
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course, is that the one view gave business interests a "preferred place,"
while the other would give it-rather selectively-to libertarian in-
terests.
Of course, one can be as creative in gauging the sense of the
community as in discovering the true meaning of the Fathers. But
there is this great difference: the community can talk back. Few, and
modem activists least of all, would be willing to accept as generally
binding the dead hand of past "intentions." " To do so would be,
in Mr. Justice Mathews words, "to deny every quality of the law but
its age." 31 Moreover, in view of the changing and contradictory
purposes that have been attributed to the Fathers, it would appear that
their meaning is at least as uncertain in the face of modern problems as
is our thinking. Given the present activist's progressive bent, one
suspects that when he pleads past purposes-always selectively-to
justify his conception of present needs, he does so because he is rea-
sonably sure his views would not be presently acceptable on their own
merits.
Must it be either a "psychoanalysis" of the present with the
humilitarians, or of the past with the activists? Max Radin proposed
a more direct approach:
[I]n that great mass of transactions which do not fit readily or
quickly into established types, or will fit into one just as easily as
another, the judge ought to be a free agent. We need not fear
arbitrariness. Our Cokes and Mansfields and Eldons derive their
physical and spiritual nourishment from the same sources that
we do. They will find good what we find good, if we will let them.
And if they had not prescribed to themselves the curious necessity
of putting the transactions to be regulated into one type-form
rather than another-assuming that it could go into either and
will not without pushing go into any-they would have no need
of their relations and imputations, their presumptions and sup-
positions, their gyrations and concatenations, and could cut
straight to the desirable result which they in common with our-
selves as members of the community prefer ....
It is an undoubted fact that the chief purpose courts fulfill in
giving us not merely a judgment but a classification of the judg-
ment by types and standards, is to make it easy for us to find out
how they think. The technique which has become traditional in
Europe and America seems to me to make it hard."
30 With modern activist views on freedom of expression and right to counsel,
contrast the "intentions" of the Fathers as set out in LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION
(1960), and BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS ch. 3 (1955).
31 Quoted in Bickel, Book Review, New Republic, May 12, 1958, pp. 16, 19.
32 Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.AJ.
357, 362 (1925).
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John Dewey propounded a similar thought in more pragmatic terms:
On the view here presented, the standard is found in consequences,
in the function of what goes on socially. If this view were gen-
erally held, there would be assurance of introduction on a large
scale of the rational factor into concrete evaluations of legal ar-
rangements. For it demands that intelligence, employing the best
scientific methods and materials available, be used, to investigate,
in terms of the context of actual situations, the consequences of
legal rules and of proposed legal decisions and acts of legislation.
The present tendency [1941], hardly more as yet than in a state
of inception, to discuss legal matters in their concrete social setting,
and not in the comparative vacuum of their relations to one
another, would get the reinforcement of a consistent legal theory.
Moreover, when it is systematically acknowledged in practice that
social facts are going concerns and that all legal matters have their
place within these ongoing concerns, there will be a much stronger
likelihood than at present that new knowledge will be acquired of
a kind which can be brought to bear upon the never-ending process
of improving standards of judgment.3
Some will insist that whatever the proclaimed standard a judge
cannot long escape his own sense of values-his own bias. Perhaps
detachment is an illusion. Maybe it belongs only to the gods. "Be
that as it may," Learned Hand admonishes,
we know that men do differ widely in this capacity; and the in-
credulity which seeks to discredit that knowledge is a part of the
crusade against reason from which we have already so bitterly
suffered. We may deny-and, if we are competent observers, we
will deny-that no one can be aware of the danger [of his bias]
and in large measure provide against it.34
Cardozo's attitude was not entirely different:
If reasoning is vitiated at times by adhering to abstractions, it is
vitiated also by starting with a prepossession and finding argu-
ments to sustain it. The weakness is inherent in the judicial
process. The important thing, however, is to rid our preposses-
sions, so far as may be, of What is merely individual or personal,
to detach them in a measure from ourselves, to build them, not
upon instinctive or intuitive likes and dislikes, but upon an in-
formed and liberal culture, a knowledge (as Arnold would have
said) of the best that has been thought and said in the world, so
far as that best has relation to the social problem to be solved.
Of course, when our utmost effort has been put forth, we shall
be far from freeing ourselves from the empire of inarticulate
3 Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in My PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 73, 84-85 (1941).
3 4 HAND, Thomas Walter Swan, in THE SpRnuT oF Linz-Ri" 209, 218 (3d ed. 1960).
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emotion, of beliefs so ingrained and inveterate as to be a portion
of our very nature . . . . The best that we can hope for is
that from the knowledge of our weakness there will come the
exercise of strength.85
Judge Frank may have been a bit more pessimistic:
In the many cases where the testimony is in conflict, can there
ever be much "objectivity" in judicial decisions, or . . . much of
uniformity in the translation of community ideals into those deci-
sions? I confess that I do not know the answer. To some extent,
the difficulty can be surmounted by self-knowledge on the part
of the judge, by a self-scrutiny revealing to him his personal
biases, followed by an effort on his part to bring them into line
with acceptable moral ideals. But that is no complete solution.
Perhaps there is none; perhaps there is. 6
In the end we must recognize that law is not a bucket of ready-
made answers, but a process, or technique, for easing an endless flux
of changing social tensions. It "is always approaching, and never
reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from life
at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at the other,
which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will become
entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow." " Legal reasoning
then involves more than logic. Judge Bok described it at its best as
"the play of an enlightened personality within the boundaries of a
system." 88 Under a facade of formal symmetry it must synthesize
established rules, pragmatic needs, and moral yearnings. It must honor
reasonable expectations born of the past and yet allow adequate
Lebensraum for the present and the future. It must have daring
moments and moments politic, moments of hope, moments of fear, and
moments of doubt. Plainly the stolid satisfaction of the hedgehog,
bristling upon a single postulate, is not for judges. They must pursue
the fox-the reason that is many reasons, the truth that cannot be
caught without destroying its vitality. In short, as Dean Levi insists,
The emphasis should be on the process. The contrast between logic
and the actual legal method is a disservice to both. Legal reason-
ing has a logic of its own. Its structure fits it to give meaning to
ambiguity and to test constantly whether society has come to
see new differences or similarities. Social theories and other
changes in society will be relevant when the ambiguity has to be
35 CRDozo, op. cit. supra note 13, at 126-27.
36 Frank, Book Review, 59 HARV. L. REv. 1004, 1011 (1946).
3 7 HOLmES, THE CoMMoN LAw 36 (1881).
8 Bor, BACKBONE OF THE HERRING 9 (1941).
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resolved for a particular case. Nor can it be said that the result
of such a method is too uncertain to compel. The compulsion of
the law is clear; the explanation is that the area of doubt is
constantly set forth. The probable area of expansion or con-
traction is foreshadowed as the system works. This is the only
kind of system which will work when people do not agree com-
pletely. The loyalty of the community is directed toward the
institution in which it participates. The words change to receive
the content which the community gives to them. The effort to
find complete agreement before the institution goes to work is
meaningless. It is to forget the very purpose for which the insti-
tution of legal reasoning has been fashioned. This should be
remembered as a world community suffers in the absence of law."
Holmes tells us he once heard an eminent judge say that he never
let a decision go until he was sure it was right:
This mode of thinking is entirely natural. The training of lawyers
is training in logic . . . and the logical method and form flatter
that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human
mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the
destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to
the relative worth and importance of competing legislative
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is
true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.
You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can
imply a condition in a contract. But why do you do it? It is
because of some belief as to the practice of the community or
of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short,
because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of
exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of
founding exact logical conclusions.40
From this it is an easy step to Cardozo's view that "a judge must
think of himself as an artist . . . who, although he must know the
handbooks, should never try to use them for his guidance; in the end
he must rely upon his almost instinctive sense of where the line [lies]
between the word and the purpose . . . behind it; he must somehow
manage to be true to both." 41
Great artistry on the bench as elsewhere means creative response
to the evolving processes of social life. It entails respect for existing
forms and values, but immunity from their strangulating grasp. Above
all, it demands a sense of paradox. For in the words of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter:
3 9 LEVY, ANe INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 73-74 (1949).
4 0 HOLMEs, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAl. PAPERS 167, 180-81 (1920).
4 1 Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 -Agv. L. REv. 361-62 (1939).
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The core of the difficulty is that there is hardly a question of any
real difficulty before the Court that does not entail more than one
so-called principle. Anybody can decide a question if only a
single principle is in controversy. Partisans and advocates often
cast a question in that form, but the form is deceptive. In a
famous passage Mr. Justice Holmes has exposed this miscon-
ception:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their
logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighbor-
hood of principles of policy which are other than those on
which the particular right is founded, and which become
strong enough to hold their own when a certain point is
reached . . . . The boundary at which the conflicting in-
terests balance cannot be determined by any general formula
in advance, but points in the line, or helping to establish it,
are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete case falls on
the nearer or farther side.
This contest between conflicting principles is not limited to
law. In a recent discussion of two books on the conflict between
the claims of literary individualism and dogma, I came across
this profound observation: ". . . But when, in any field of
human observation, two truths appear in conflict it is wiser
to assume that neither is exclusive, and that their contra-
diction, though it may be hard to bear, is part of the mystery of
things." But judges cannot leave such contradiction between
conflicting "truths" as "part of the mystery of things."
They have to adjudicate. If the conflict cannot be resolved, the
task of the Court is to arrive at an accommodation of the contend-
ing claims. This is the core of the difficulties and misunder-
standings about the judicial process. This, for any conscientious
judge, is the agony of his duty.4"
4 2 Frankfurter, supra note 7, at 238.
